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Abstract: When Julius Stone published his famous essay, The Province of 
Jurisprudence Redetermined, in 1944, he had reasonable cause for genuine 
optimism. English jurisprudence had been in the doldrums since the initial 
flurry of activity and excitement following Austin’s launch of the modern 
project of analytical jurisprudence in 1832 with his The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined. Most of the subsequent scholarship had simply 
refined and riffed unimaginatively on the basic Austinian themes. Yet, as 
the Second World War came to a close, there were signs that the time was 
ripe for a different and more vibrant approach to jurisprudential study. 
Julius Stone was at the forefront of such a spirited revival.  Unfortunately, 
history has not been kind to Stone’s optimistic obituary for analytical 
jurisprudence. Within a decade of his famous essay’s publication, Hart’s 
revival of legal positivism had restored the flagging fortunes of analytical 
jurisprudence.  More sociologically-based efforts to expand the province 
of jurisprudence continued to be treated as marginal and secondary. This is 
an unfortunate state of affairs.  Accordingly, in this essay, I want to do 
three things -- to chronicle the hold that analytical jurisprudence still 
exerts as the ‘default theory’ of much legal thought and practice; to 
explore how Stone may have unintentionally contributed to that state of 
affairs; and to suggest how that continuing influence can be arrested and 
perhaps reversed. I intend to push through on an unconditional critique of 
analytical jurisprudence and to recommend an alternative approach that 
derives its rationale and motivation from a robust commitment to what I 
will term ‘strong democracy’. 
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THE PROVICE OF JURISPRUDENCE (REALLY) 
REDETERMINED 




A. HEADING 2 
 
1. HEADING 3 
 
“Insofar as the theory of justice has been taught at all it has 
been presented as a body of ideas beyond the proper 
scrutiny of the discreet lawyer, rather than as a necessary 
part of his equipment.” 
         
 -- Julius Stone 
 
 When Julius Stone published his famous essay, The Province of 
Jurisprudence Redetermined, in 1944, he had reasonable cause for genuine 
optimism.  English jurisprudence had been in the doldrums since the initial 
flurry of activity and excitement following Austin’s launch of  the modern 
project of analytical jurisprudence in 1832 with his The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined.  Most of the subsequent scholarship had 
simply refined and riffed unimaginatively on the basic Austinian themes.  
Yet, as the Second World War came to a close, there were signs that the 
time was ripe for a different and more vibrant approach to jurisprudential 
                                                 
* Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto.  I am grateful to Paul Hughes, Brian Tamanaha, Rachael Walsh, and Joel Colon-
Rios for their critical comments and helpful suggestions.  This essay draws upon material 
to be published as part of THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATISED 
by Oxford University Press. 
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study.  Stone was at the forefront of such a spirited revival.  Fresh from an 
invigorating stretch in the United States during the 1930s where he was 
inspired by the Realist writings generally and those of his mentor, Roscoe 
Pound, in particular, Stone was imbued with a broader sense of 
jurisprudence’s possibilities for understanding law as a social process.  
Consequently, after a reign of over a century, Stone seemed justified in 
concluding that the long-standing dominion of analytical jurisprudence 
was finally coming to a warranted end.   
 
 Unfortunately, history has not been kind to Stone’s optimistic 
obituary for analytical jurisprudence.  Within a decade of his famous 
essay’s publication, Hart’s revival of legal positivism had restored the 
flagging fortunes of analytical jurisprudence.  More sociologically-based 
efforts to expand the province of jurisprudence continued to be treated as 
marginal and secondary.   Indeed, although there has been some progress 
in the last few years, analytical jurisprudence remains the default legal 
theory of the academe and, insofar as it is cognizant of such matters, the 
practising bar.  This is an unfortunate state of affairs.  Accordingly, in this 
essay, I want to do three things -- to chronicle the hold that analytical 
jurisprudence still exerts as the ‘default theory’ of much legal thought and 
practice; to explore how Stone may have unintentionally contributed to 
that state of affairs; and to suggest how that continuing influence can be 
arrested and perhaps reversed.  I intend to push through on an 
unconditional critique of analytical jurisprudence and to recommend an 
alternative approach that derives its rationale and motivation from a robust 
commitment to what I will term ‘strong democracy’. 
 
 
I. ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE RULES 
 
 Efforts to understand law’s general workings and character have 
been legion.  From Plato and before, the attempt to appreciate the role of 
law in society has been a standard feature of academic  texts and popular 
commentary.1  However, until the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, 
                                                 
     1  See, for example, EDWIN PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS 
OF THE LAW (1953). 




these inquiries were very much part of a larger literature on justice and 
government; there was scant attention paid to the more rarified task of 
understanding law in and on its own terms.  However, in 1932, John 
Austin set about changing that situation.  With his The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined and its central ambition to develop “the science 
of jurisprudence (or, simply and briefly, jurisprudence)”2, he decreed that 
‘what is law?’ was the question to be answered by legal theorists and 
secondly that philosophical analysis was the way to go about answering it.  
While Austin’s own exertions to provide a convincing answer were 
unsuccessful and of no lasting significance, his pioneering efforts to 
delineate the intellectual territory on which these endeavours  took place 
and to suggest legitimate ways to perform them has become the official 
modus operandi of jurists.  The basic thrust of analytical jurisprudence is 
the sustained effort to provide an understanding of ‘law’ which is both 
universal (i.e., it transcends any particular or local practices) and general 
(i.e., it encompasses and informs all other inquiries into law).   Although 
other disciplinary approaches enjoy periodic favour in legal academe, they 
are treated as distinctly supplemental.  Analytical jurisprudence has 
become jurisprudence tout court.   
 
 For over a century after Austin’s The Province launched the central 
project of analytical jurisprudence, his ideas remained dominant and were 
uncritically followed by several generations of jurists.  However, by the 
1940s, it seemed to be generally conceded that, whatever its former 
significance and intellectual pre-eminence, analytical jurisprudence was 
on the ropes, if not actually out for the count.  For instance, in 1941, John 
Dewey had opined that positivism “already wears a certain antiquarian air, 
so that it is hard even in the imagination to see why once it had such 
vogue.”3  So by 1944, when Julius Stone published his famous essay, The 
Province of Jurisprudence Redetermined, he had reasonable cause for 
genuine optimism in committing “an act of revolt” against Austinian 
                                                 
     2  JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 126 
(1832: H.L.A. Hart ed. 1955). 
     3  John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 81 (1941).  
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tradition.4  Yet, only a few years later, a revival of an Austin-based 
analytical jurisprudence had begun in earnest.   This was largely down to 
the singular efforts of Herbert Hart who had been appointed to the Oxford 
Chair of Jurisprudence in 1952.  Almost single-handedly, he undertook a 
bracing and critical revitalization of the analytical tradition; it was Hart’s 
dubious destiny to dispel the musty fug around The Province and to bring 
analytical jurisprudence, especially in its positivist incarnation, squarely 
and decidedly back in vogue.  Although he completely rejected Austin’s 
‘command theory’ of law, Hart did so in order to fulfil better Austin’s 
broader analytical ambitions and to locate “the key to the science of 
jurisprudence.”5   
 
 Nevertheless, despite its undoubted dominance in the second half 
of the Twentieth Century, analytical jurisprudence is now considered to 
have had its day.  Indeed, there is much to be said for the standard and 
increasing chorus of contemporary disapproval -- “flat and repetitive”, 
“socially unaware but philosophically obsessed”, “repetitions, trivial, and 
almost entirely pointless”, and “almost scholastic”6 -- about analytical 
jurisprudence.  However, any assessment that an Austin-inspired 
analytical jurisprudence is on its last legs is hasty and merely wishful 
                                                 
     4  Julius Stone, The Province of Jurisprudence Redetermined, 7 MOD. L. REV. 97 
(1944). 
     5  Hart, supra, note 10 at 81.  Although The Concept of Law is feted as a monumental 
contribution to legal philosophy, Hart originally wrote it  “with English undergraduate 
readers in mind.”  Id. at 238. 
     6  Jeremy Waldron, Legal and Political Philosophy in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 381 (2002); Frederick Schauer, 
Positivism Through Thick and Thin in ANALYZING LAW; NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
THEORY 69 (Brian Bix ed. 1998); William Twining, Imagining Bentham: A Celebration 
in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1998: LEGAL THEORY AT THE END OF THE 
MILLENNIUM 21 (M.D.A. Freeman ed. 1998); and James Allen, A Modest Proposal, 23 
OXF. J. of LEG. STUD. 197 at 209 (2003).  See also David Dyzenhaus, Positivism’s 
Stagnant Research Programme, 20 OXF. J. of LEG. STUD. 703 at 719 (2000); Dennis 
Patterson, Notes on the Methodology Debate in Contemporary Jurisprudence: Why 
Sociologists Might be Interested, 8 LAW & SOCIOLOGY 254 at 258 (Michael Freeman 
ed. 2005); and Brian Tamanaha,  The Contemporary Relevance of Legal Positivism, 32 
AUST. J. OF LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2007). 




thinking.  If the amount of material published in analytical jurisprudence 
and about it is any indicator, it is very much alive and kicking.  Also, the 
quantity of output is reasonably matched by its high quality.  Some of the 
leading academics of their generation are part of the analytical tradition; 
Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and Jules Coleman stand in the first rank of 
legal scholarship by any lights.  Although the United Kingdom remains its 
traditional seat, many analytical jurists reside and write in the United 
States: Fred Schauer, Stephen Perry, Jeremy Waldron and others cannot be 
dismissed as mere bit-players.7  While the leading figures of analytical 
jurisprudence are predominantly male, there are a few important female 
contributors, such as Nicola Lacey and Julie Dickson, to this tradition.  
Notwithstanding its continuing publishing presence, critics still contend 
that analytical jurisprudence has lost any genuine relevance and influence 
for the performance of modern legal scholarship and study at large.  While 
this is a tempting assessment, it is mistaken. 
 
 Analytical  jurisprudence is still very much an intellectual force to 
be reckoned with not only in legal academe, but also for bench and bar.  In 
direct opposition to the claims of its would-be undertakers, analytical  
jurisprudence can be treated as the default theory of the legal world; its 
influence is so common and so ingrained that it has become almost 
pervasive and unappreciated.  While there is no deep and monolithic 
causal link between analytical jurisprudence and all contemporary law-
jobs, there is a strong connection and, at least, a plausible complementarity 
between analytical jurisprudence and the formalist/doctrinal tradition of 
legal scholarship.  Indeed, the available data strongly suggests that, while 
there has been a definite increase in the amount and range of ‘law and’ 
scholarship, there is no convincing sense in which “law journal articles 
became significantly less doctrinal in the period between 1982 and 1996”: 
the resort to a variety of instrumental and empirical approaches has tended 
to operate “as methods to enrich the analysis of doctrine, not as substitutes 
                                                 
     7  The empirical literature is weak and offers little serious help.  Available data tends 
to be jurisdiction-specific and subject-specific.  See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited 
Legal Books Published Since 1978, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (2000) and Brian Leiter’s 
Law School Reports at http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/.  Ironically, analytical 
jurisprudence fares best and tends to dominate in the category ‘British Legal Books Most 
Cited in Social Sciences Citation Index’ with five (Herbert Hart, John Finnis, Neil 
MacCormick and Joseph Raz twice) in the top Ten.  Shapiro, id. 
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for it.”8  Insofar as analytical jurisprudence gives priority to theoretical 
argumentation, sound evidence, avoidance of ambiguity, conceptual 
clarity, systemic coherence, and ahistorical orientation, doctrinal 
scholarship aspires to adopt similar tools and techniques: it takes a set of 
accepted legal materials and sources, extracts from them their underlying 
patterns and essential structures, and re-organizes those materials in line 
with a more coherent and compelling account of the issue to be analysed.  
Of course, while such conceptual work is often supplemented and 
reinforced by reference to some favoured set of instrumental, empirical or 
teleological criteria, such reference is selective: it is the non-analytical 
exception that proves the analytical rule.  Moreover, this style and 
approach remains the stock-in-trade of most law reviews and periodicals. 
 
 Similar claims can also be made about legal education, 
adjudication and legal practice generally.  Apart from legal theory courses 
(which still orient themselves around analytical debates), the 
analytical/conceptual approach still dominates in the classroom.  Teachers, 
often indifferent to subject-matter, present the basic resources and 
materials of the law in their most coherent and organised manner: criticism 
is largely reserved for pointing out inconsistencies, discrepancies, 
incongruities, etc.  For instance, an examination of standard and popular 
casebooks reveals that the core mission is to select the basic legal sources 
and doctrinal materials, to pose a series of questions about how one case 
or principle relates to another, and to thereby illuminate the formal 
categories and structures which underpin the law.  Again, of course, many 
teachers bring to their classes a variety of different perspectives (e.g., 
economic, historical, social, moral, etc.), but they are used to counter-
balance and, only occasionally, subvert or supplement this pre-dominantly 
internalised analysis.  The often unstated premise that law students soon 
seize upon is that it is their ability to learn the formal tools of legal 
analysis (rather the extant details of legal doctrine) and then apply them to 
extant legal materials that will be most prized.9 
                                                 
     8  Robert Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 517 at 523 and 524 (2000). 
     9  See, for example, W. FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYSTS: A TOOLKIT 
FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW (2007).  





 Judges pay little direct attention to the work of jurisprudential 
scholars: reference to basic texts and writings tend to be selective and 
sporadic at best.  Also, their reference to academic commentary generally, 
even in its more doctrinal mode, is limited and unsystematic; the tendency 
is to utilise it as persuasive rather than authoritative sources.  When they 
do cite such material, they are critical of it for its failure to be more useful 
to the performance of their immediate responsibilities in determining 
cases.  Nevertheless, in mounting such critiques against modern scholarly 
literature, they do tend to give a back-handed approval to a depiction of 
adjudication that meshes quite easily with the mood of analytical 
jurisprudence.  For instance, one senior Canadian judge has noted that 
“academic commentary that is useful to judges is that which assembles and 
rationalizes judicial decisions in a given field of law ... [and] draws out the 
general principles that these decisions imply.”10  It is not surprising that 
judicial practice should be reasonably in line with the underlying 
theoretical framework of both legal scholarship and legal education.  
Within the confines of democratic constitutionalism and separation of 
powers, judges maintain that their basic commitment and responsibility is 
to identify the law, develop it in a consistent and principled fashion, and 
apply to the facts at hand.  Of course, judges embrace the idea that 
‘justice’ is an integral component of any sound and defensible adjudicative 
practice, but they maintain that such a challenge can be best met by 
‘following the rules laid down’ as much as by fashioning or tailoring new 
rules from whole cloth.  In line with the general orientation of analytical 
jurisprudence, the self-image of the rank-and-file judge is that of a 
technician and bureaucrat as much as policy-maker.  The discourse of 
precedents, appropriate sources, binding authority, principled consistency 
and the like is very much the working language of the judges.  Of course, 
there are examples of cases and opinions where the analytical temper gives 
way to a more substantive imperative, but these are again exceptional 
instances that point up the more usual and precedent-following approach 
                                                 
     10  Michel Bastarache, The Role of Academics and Legal Theory in Judicial 
Decision-Making, 37 ALTA L. REV. 739 at 740 (1999).  See also Harry Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH . L. 
REV. 34 (1992). 
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that explains the greater balance of adjudicative practice.11 
 
 Again, although most practising lawyers give little thought or even 
respect to jurisprudential writings, the traditional underpinnings of legal 
practice depend on a definite theoretical model of what lawyers should do 
if they wish to act with legal and professional responsibility.  Moreover, 
the regnant model is closely allied to analytical positivism both 
theoretically and historically.  This manifests itself in two different ways.  
First, the traditional image of lawyering is centred on the idea that lawyers 
are super-technocrats; they possess a special set of talents and techniques 
which they deploy for the advantage of the people who hire them.  
Lawyers are encouraged to be neutral on the substantive content and thrust 
of the law; their task is very much to apply the law, a little to criticize it, 
but most certainly not to make it.  Their commitment is to the legal system 
which, even when they are working around and within it, must be accepted 
as given.  While they are permitted some misgivings about the merit of 
particular laws or decisions, these are to be treated as mistakes or 
deviations from the correct path of the law.  Their faith in the system’s 
overall correctness is what underpins their support for the basic Rule of 
Law and its values.  From an analytical standpoint, they subscribe to the 
general separation of law and morality as well emphasising the importance 
of source over substance.  Secondly, lawyers must almost be indifferent to 
the identity of their clients and the moral rectitude of their interests.  
Lawyers’ primary obligation is to their clients and it is these interests 
which must be put ahead of all others.  Echoing a strongly positivist 
commitment, one proponent of the traditional approach states that “a 
lawyer is morally entitled to act in this formal, representative way even if 
the result is an injustice, because the legal system which authorises both 
the injustice ... and the formal gesture for working it insulates him from 
personal moral responsibility.”12   
                                                 
     11  This is not to suggest that judges always (or perhaps ever) do what they say that 
they do.  See A. HUTCHINSON, IT’S ALL IN THE GAME: A NON-
FOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW AND ADJUDICATION (2000).  Also, the 
connection between analytical jurisprudence and legal formalism is far from straight-
forward or established. 
     12  Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 at 1084 (1976).  For a critique of this, see A. 





 Consequently, although Austin and The Province’s influence is 
more indirect than direct, analytical jurisprudence remains highly 
significant to the worlds of legal theory, legal scholarship and even legal 
education.  Lawyers remain in relative thrall to its intimations and 
admonitions.  However, while this might offer some reassurance to 
analytical jurists, it ought not to suggest that its pervasive, if unappreciated 
influence is testament to its validity or merit.  Its ubiquitous and long-
standing presence cannot underwrite its contested theoretical status.  
While the jurisprudential rejection of analytical jurisprudence will not 
necessarily end its influence on legal scholarship and legal education, it 
will demand that there be a different and better defence of its customary 
dominance or, at least, that the political basis of its enduring appeal will be 
more widely appreciated.  It was to Stone’s eternal credit that he launched 
a full-blown assault on analytical jurisprudence and sought to offer a 
compelling alternative.  However, in characteristic, but misplaced gesture 
of generosity, he made unnecessary concessions to the analytical approach 
to jurisprudential study that enabled it to maintain an undeserved 
intellectual legitimacy.  It is to Stone’s critique that I now turn. 
 
 
II. STONE’S REVOLT 
 
 In jurisprudence, as with comedy, timing is everything.  The years 
that Julius Stone spent in the United States from 1931 to 1936 at Harvard 
Law School had a massive impact on him throughout his academic career.  
This was the heyday of American Legal Realism.  Under the mentorship 
of Harvard’s Dean, the monumental Roscoe Pound, Stone breathed in the 
rich intellectual air of this anti-formalist tendency and warmed to its 
iconoclastic attitude.  So invigorated, he determined to begin his own 
jurisprudential work as “an act of revolt” against the stifling influence of 
the Austinian tradition of analytical jurisprudence which still held sway in 
the rest of the English-speaking world.13  Although this commitment was 
                                                                                                                         
HUTCHINSON, LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ch.3 (2nd 
ed.  2006). 
     13  Stone, The Province of Jurisprudence Redetermined, 7 MOD. L. REV. 97 (1944).  
 
 
10                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 04 
 
to be the initial making and lasting bedrock of his academic career, it was 
also ironically to be the source of his limited appeal and stature in English 
and Commonwealth legal theory circles.  With Hart’s transforming revival 
of the analytical tradition, Stone’s work was kept outside the 
jurisprudential mainstream. 
 
 In his path-breaking essay of 1944, Stone lamented the fact that 
“analytical jurisprudence is ‘The Jurisprudence’.”  He demonstrated that, 
while conceptual illumination and logical clarification were not 
unpardonable ills, they must not be understood as valid jurisprudential 
ends in themselves: they must be deployed in the service of a fuller 
account of law’s social operation and institutional role.  For Stone, there 
was much more to law and its theoretical study than a dry and self-serving 
“logic chopping.”  Revealing his sociological leanings, he showed how 
Bentham and Austin’s reformist efforts to discredit natural law thinking 
were “so effective ... that the theory of justice itself was stricken low and 
so far as English law teaching is concerned has not to this day fully 
recovered.”  Indeed, it was this tendency for “a dominant Austinianism ... 
to exclude all other inquiries”  that most angered Stone.  While he 
conceded that “the logical treatment of analytical jurisprudence is not 
‘fallacious’ within its own proper universe of discourse,”  he insisted that 
such a narrow perspective must be supplemented by a jurisprudential 
approach which better connected, not further severed law from its social 
causes and consequences.14 
 
 For example, Stone took a robustly censorial stance towards Hart’s 
work.  Although Hart’s refurbishment of Austin’s command theory by 
way of elucidating how law was a system of primary and secondary rules 
was destined to take the jurisprudential world by storm and remain regnant 
for the second half of the Twentieth century, Stone thought very little of  
The Concept of Law.  He considered its linguistic-based contribution to 
jurisprudential study to be “derivative or terminological or 
inconsequential”.  In particular, Stone could not view it as being the huge 
                                                                                                                         
This essay is incorporated in a slightly revised, if much expanded form in THE 
PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW: LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL, A STUDY IN JURISPRUDENCE (1947). 
     14  Stone, The Province, id. at 98, 99, 102, 103 and 179. 




step forward in jurisprudential thinking that its champions proclaimed.  He 
saw it as further narrowing inquiry and cutting off legal theory from more 
enriching and expansive versions and visions of what might be the best 
approach to useful jurisprudential endeavour.  Barely managing to 
disguise his exasperation that such a rewarmed dish of legal positivism 
should marginalise his own more innovative work, he found Hart’s claim 
that he was offering ‘an essay in descriptive sociology’ to be, at best, “a 
puzzle.”15  Stone would be the first to applaud a shift in jurisprudential 
away from the claustrophobic concerns of analytical jurists towards a 
more expansive ‘sociological’ focus, but Hart’s celebrated philosophical 
monograph was decidedly not the vehicle for achieving this. 
 
 In order to make a much more serious job of producing ‘an essay 
in descriptive sociology’, Stone set about offering his own theory of law-
and-society jurisprudence.  Like his mentor Pound, Stone took on board 
the bracing Realist critique of analytical jurisprudence, but he maintained 
that law and its study must be based on more solid footings than 
thoroughgoing scepticism and practical experience.  For Pound and Stone, 
Realism was not an end in itself, but a means to a more informed and 
richer understanding of law’s operations.  Taking a more rigorous 
scientific approach over Realism’s pragmatic leanings, he devoted himself 
to developing an expansive law-and-society approach to legal theory.  
Apart from takingisaw sociology as a science which could provide 
invariant and validated facts about human nature and social relationships 
and thereby “deliver law-like generalities about law” so that “knowledge 
of the social process can be extended and that man’s power over his own 
destiny can increase with that knowledge.”16 
 
 Yet, although quite radical in its day and influential even today, 
Stone’s straddling of the Formalist-Realist divide left him vulnerable.  In 
particular, his unwillingness to abandon entirely the search for a more 
                                                 
     15  LEONIE STARR, JULIUS STONE: AN INTELLECTUAL LIFE 162 (1992).  
For a fascinating comparison of Stone and Hart’s lives, see Michael Kirby, H.L.A. Hart, 
Julius Stone, and the Struggle for the Soul of Law, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 323 (2005). 
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compelling and foundationalist framework for understanding law placed 
him closer to the analytical tradition than he intended or desired.  As part 
of his ‘act of revolt’ against the Austinian tradition of analytical 
jurisprudence, Stone only went so far as to insist that it be placed in  
“perspective” and its “limited nature” be appreciated.  He was not 
prepared to announce that analytical jurisprudence had a pervasive 
negative influence and ought to be abandoned entirely.  Throughout his 
career, he recognised that analytical jurisprudence has a place in the 
curriculum, “but its limited nature should be recognised.”  Alongside the 
analytical project, he demanded that  a place must be found in the 
jurisprudence syllabus for Sociological (or Functional) Jurisprudence and 
for a jurisprudence of justice.  Only once jurisprudence has been 
rearranged in accordance with what Stone terms “the Analytical-
Sociological-Theory of Justice division” might it “escape from the present 
impasse, in which all branches of jurisprudence are treated as but ancillary 
to analytical jurisprudence.”  As such, Stone concluded that it must no 
longer remain the case that a theory of justice is considered “beyond the 
proper scrutiny of the discreet lawyer, rather than as a necessary part of his 
equipment.”17 
 
 Whether this recognition of analytical jurisprudence’s continuing, 
if limited relevance was a matter of strategic academic manoeuvring (so 
that he would not be marginalised even more) or as a genuine intellectual 
acknowledgment is unclear.  However, what is clear is that, for all its 
improvement upon the traditional literature of contemporary 
jurisprudence, Stone’s own sociological alternative is closer in disciplinary 
spirit to the analytical project than he appreciated or cared to accept.  
Although he took a less internalised approach and nurtured a revived 
interest in the just dimensions of law, he still shared something of the 
scientistic and universalistic ambitions of the analytical project.  Whereas 
many analytical jurists sought to ground law in its own internal structures 
and logic, Stone worked to offer a determinative account which drew upon 
the “elementary doctrine of the social sciences that law is conditioned by 
the social, political, and economic environment as well as by human 
                                                 
     17  See PROVINCE AND FUNCTION, supra, note ** at vii, 31, 182, 192, 187 and 
11. 




thought processes.”18  Although he allowed for some of the vagaries of 
‘human thought processes’, his considerable oeuvre is clearly based on the 
belief that it is possible and desirable to make science-like claims about 
law’s social character and function.  He is in the Austinian business of 
seeking to deliver some of the secure truths and dependable knowledge 
that have so far eluded traditional analytical jurisprudence by developing 
“the science of jurisprudence (or, simply and briefly, jurisprudence)” by 
way of the social sciences.19  
 
 In delivering the ‘essay in descriptive sociology’ that Hart 
promised, but failed to deliver, Stone embraced the sociological method as 
a better way to explain the evolution of law and its adjudicative 
performance.  In so doing, he placed faith in the capacity of a more 
empirical-based analysis to put some scientific backbone into the mushier 
techniques of traditional legal analysis and ensure that the policy-making 
practices of law would be better and more reliably informed.20  However, 
while scientific thinking can certainly add something to the jurisprudential 
project, it is folly to maintain that it can completely rule the field and 
become the master-method for obtaining knowledge about law which will 
replace all other techniques and vocabularies.  Stone’s scientific turn is 
less towards science than it is towards scientism.  He manages to pull off 
the dubious feat of turning a series of relatively soft and loose intuitions 
about law in the late Twentieth Century into a pseudo-scientific theory of 
supposed hard facts about law and society generally.  In short, although 
Stone claimed to stand on solid ground when he engages with law’s facts, 
social interests and their relationship, the epistemological and ontological 
place where he stands and the facts that he analyses are much mushier and 
                                                 
     18  Stone, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra, note ** at 190. 
     19  JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 77-
78 and 126 (1832: H.L.A. Hart ed. 1955). 
     20  Apart from Pound’s own wide-ranging work, the effort to rely on the social 
sciences has a long pedigree and is currently experiencing something of a jurisprudential 
revival.  See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
(2007) and Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. ** (2008). 
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evaluative than he or other legal sociologists pretend.  Although such 
sociological pursuits are illuminating, they are not foundational in the way 
that their exponents think. In a manner of speaking, when it comes to 
understanding law, it is relative mushiness (i.e., historical contexts, social 
values and political interests) all over the place and all the way down. 
 
 Accordingly, in redetermining the province of jurisprudence, I 
want to take a different tack to Stone.  Rather than take a stand in the name 
of a ‘law-and-society’ sensibility, I will advance a critique in line with a 
more thoroughly pragmatic approach to law and legal theory.  Stone 
pointed us in the right direction in his apparent rejection of analytical 
jurisprudence, but he stopped short in travelling down that path to its 
suggested destination.  If he had taken a few steps further along this anti-
analytical path, he might have moved beyond its debilitating influence.  As 
it was, he remained within the intellectual force-field of analytical 
philosophy.  Although he was committed to shaking off the limited and 
limiting role of analytical jurisprudence, Stone remained within the ample 
embrace of its underlying philosophical tradition in which epistemology 
and truth continued to hold sway as the ruling standards.  In moving from 
legal theory to law-and-society theory, he shifted from the study into the 
street, but he still retained much the same mind-set when he excavated and 
explored law’ social interests and dynamics.  Stone was still in the 
business of not only looking to ground the jurisprudential in something 
outside itself and outside history, but also establishing the enduring and 
scientific status of such connections.  In contrast, I maintain that the best 
way to challenge analytical jurisprudence is to forego any lingering 
attachment to such traditional shibboleths as truth, objectivity and 
universality in offering conceptual certainties or sociological insights.  I 
suggest a pragmatic and democratic jurisprudential account that measures 
the worth of legal theory less by the lights of abstract philosophical 
speculation and more by the demands of useful political knowledge. 
 
III. A DEMOCRATIC TURN 
 
 Analytical jurists have made considerable contributions to the 
understanding of law as a privileged mode of social ordering.  However, it 
is their foundational claim that a strictly philosophical and conceptual 




approach to law is the primary and best jurisprudential method by which 
to proceed that offends.  The assertion of disciplinary authority over rival 
approaches is the full measure of their wrongdoing.  This analytical focus 
has done much more harm than good: its presumptive refinement and 
clarity has been outweighed by its revealed narrowness and abstraction.  
Masquerading as a general and detached pursuit that can be relevant to all 
legal systems in all places at all times, analytical jurisprudence has a 
definite history and is part of a contested political tradition.  Indeed, for all 
its claims to rigour and exactness, this philosophical tendency has much 
softer and more contingent foundations than is supposed or claimed: it is 
not the hard and detached discipline that its proponents recommend it to 
be.  As a political tradition as much as an intellectual tendency, analytical 
jurisprudence deserves to be assessed in terms of its political orientation 
generally and its democratic compatibility particularly. 
 
 Democracy is the commitment par excellence to the idea that 
almost all choices and actions have political roots and political 
consequences: people can tackle those politics within a framework within 
which their active participation is more important than (or, at least, as 
important as) that of elected representatives, political sages or judicial 
officials.  In contrast to its present weak and anaemic practice, therefore, 
strong democracy has a broad mandate (i.e., including social and 
economic as well as political matters) and deep mandate (i.e., requiring 
regular and sustained acts of participation) which combine to ensure that 
people become full and active citizens.  Members of society are neither 
subjects nor subservients, but ‘citizens’ in the fullest sense of that term; 
they should be empowered to participate in all aspects of the political, 
social and intellectual life of the community.21  
 
 In developing a democratic jurisprudence, therefore, it will be 
important to ensure that jurists do not become part of another ruling elite.  
Democracy is opposed to all efforts to accumulate and exercise power by 
the few over the many; it seeks to exert a centrifugal rather than centripetal 
influence on power.  This democratic admonition against elite control is 
                                                 
     21  For fuller development of ‘strong democracy’, see ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, 
THE COMPANIES WE KEEP: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE (2006). 
 
 
16                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 04 
 
particularly pertinent in regard to analytical jurisprudence.  Claiming to 
speak in the name of universal truths and under the authority of abstract 
authority, analytical jurists represent a subtle, yet substantial threat to the 
democratic project.  As a philosophical enterprise, analytical jurisprudence 
commits itself to the idea that a successful theory of law must locate those 
essential properties of law which are both necessarily true and are 
adequate to distinguish it from other modes of social control: it must “tell 
us truths which illuminate that which is most important about and 
characteristic of law.”22  Indeed, much of contemporary jurisprudence has 
become largely epistemological in that a central concern is with 
determining the truth-conditions for knowledge about law.  Although there 
are recent indications of a less hubristic stance, there remains a certain 
confidence that the traditional analytical tools -- theoretical argumentation, 
objective evidence, conceptual clarity, systemic coherence, ahistorical 
orientation, etc. -- are up to the task of laying solid epistemological 
foundations for the essentialist project of analytical jurisprudence.  This is 
an elitist enterprise of the first order.  By holding out the alluring prospect 
of objective knowledge about law’s practices, analytical jurists exhibit a 
lack of confidence in their fellow citizens and set themselves up as 
philosophical experts who not only know something better about law, but 
also know something better about ‘knowing’.  
 
 In contrast, the strong democrat insists that there is no 
philosophical authority that can claim priority over a democratic 
community of good-willed participants coming together and deciding what 
is the most useful thing to do in difficult circumstances: “there’s no God, 
no reality, no nothing that takes precedence over the consensus of a free 
people -- there’s no court of appeal higher than a democratic consensus.”23  
In allowing for the epistemological possibility that there is an analytical 
                                                 
     22  JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY 25 (2001). 
     23  A Conversation with Richard Rorty, ATLANTIC UNBOUND, April 23rd 1998.  
RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 181 (1979).  
See also RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982) and 
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, SOLIDARITY (1989).  While strongly 
influenced by Richard Rorty’s writings,  I re-work his pragmatism in line with a stronger 
commitment to democratic politics.  See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE 
OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATISED (2008). 




method for ‘illuminating truths’ which is separate from a democratic 
society’s own efforts to act justly and fairly and which can underwrite 
those efforts, analytical jurists betray the democratic spirit of inquiry, 
debate, and action.  To differing degrees, analytical jurists set themselves 
up as comprising an illegitimate court of appeal and claim expert status in 
determining knowledge about the reality of law’s truth.  This can be true 
whether such jurists look to conceptual analysis or social science as their 
guiding standard. 
 
 Strong democrats resist such analytical claims.  Locating 
knowledge and truth within a communal set of practices and engagements, 
they evince an implacable opposition to epistemological methodology 
generally: they want to engineer a shift from philosophical reflection to 
political engagement.  This involves a relentless insistence that there are 
no bright-line boundaries or essential methodological differences between 
theory and practice, natural and social science, facts and values, 
philosophy and conversation, and, of course, law and politics.  It is not that 
these categorical distinctions are thought to collapse in on each other and 
have no relevant differences at all, but that such differences are contingent 
and social because they always arise from and within, directly or 
indirectly, their sustaining historical and political context.  Like law itself, 
legal theory is seen to be thoroughly political in scope and substance.  As 
such, a thoroughgoing democratic approach maintains that there is no 
possibility of a purely descriptive jurisprudence insofar as that entails 
resort to any kind of epistemological device that strives to ascend to a 
higher ahistorical ground from which to deliver truths, conceptual or 
social, about law’s identity or the essential qualities of other social 
practices.  While experience has taught that some techniques or resources 
are better suited to produce reliable results in some fields than others, there 
is no detached or definitive vantage-point from which to determine which 
technique or resource is objectively suited to one task or another.  There 
are only needed those arguments and reasons which have passed social 
muster in an open and intelligent exchange.  Moreover, because these 
social conversations and philosophical conventions are themselves open to 
the changing and dynamic forces of historical contestation, they are at 
least vulnerable to and often affected by political and social values.   
 
 Rather than appreciate it as a self-contained philosophical pursuit, 
analytical jurisprudence can be more usefully apprehended as part of a 
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continuing political tradition which privileges certain values and interests 
over others.24  Once understood as an engaged political intervention, 
analytical jurisprudence can be evaluated in terms of its compatibility with 
the demands and standards of a democratic approach.  As with almost all 
other social practices, the disciplinary strictures of analytical jurisprudence 
will be shown not to be immune from the push-and-pull of various social, 
economic, institutional, ideological and cultural currents.  Because 
objectivity is about compliance with those accepted and agreed-upon 
standards for justifying knowledge, it will be crucial to ascertain and 
examine the terms and conditions under which such social agreements are 
reached and enforced.  Of course, it ought to come as no surprise that such 
understandings and arrangements are themselves subject to the contingent 
play of various practical forces and professional interests.  Consequently, 
what has managed to get itself accepted in the relevant community of 
scholarly study will be attributable to more than (or, perhaps, less than) the 
raw force of a ‘good idea’.  As Stone glimpsed, but did not fully act upon, 
the virtues of factual or epistemic values are not as apparent or insulated 
from political values as their proponents would recommend: they are 
similarly, if not equally connected to the social matrix of forces that 
gestate and perpetuate them. 
 
 A more suitable characterisation of the jurist’s function is to be 
found in the exhortation to worry less about flying higher or digging 
deeper to ascertain truth and knowledge about law which has enduring 
validity beyond society’s own situation and challenges.  Instead, jurists 
who are prepared to follow through unconditionally on the democratic 
imperative look to explore and broaden the ways in which a society’s 
conversations about law can be made more useful to its members.  This 
involves the acceptance that there are no conversation-ending or truth-
fixing arguments other than those that gain acceptance in engaged debate 
and open inquiry in particular historical circumstances.  Consequently, 
democratic jurists will eschew the analytical tendency to take such matters 
entirely out of the hands of citizens and to reserve them as only for those 
with philosophical or jurisprudential competence.  The more modest role 
of jurists is to use their technical skill and institutional experience to 
                                                 
     24  See David Dyzenhaus, The Genealogy of Legal Positivism, 24 OXF J. OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 39 at 40 (2004). 




facilitate and contribute to democratic debate, not usurp it in the name of 
philosophical authority.  In meeting such a task, the effort to determine 
and defend insights about law in terms of their universal merit or enduring 
appeal is simply a distraction.  Rather than take an almost perverse pride 
in the unworldliness of their views, democratic jurists will recognise that 
treating their work as ‘local enthusiasms’ is a useful compliment, not a 
dismissive criticism. 
 
 There is nothing about this defence of a robustly democratic 
society which depends on any philosophical claim or epistemological 
back-up that such a society is more natural, more rational, more coherent, 
more pure or more anything else than any other society.  And it is certainly 
not that it more closely approximates to some established notion of Truth.  
On the contrary, it is simply a practical argument that such a society is 
more useful in a world in which there are no philosophically-mandated 
truths and in which people must be allowed to experiment for themselves 
with how they might best be organised and live their lives.  Democracy’s 
appeal is that it establishes its own ‘foundations’ and ‘authority’ by 
making them the property of the community and by ensuring that they are 
always open to critical transformation.  Because it is deliberative rather 
than programmatic, strong democracy reinforces and comes closest to 
actualising a social and institutional practice which keeps faith with the 
key pragmatic claim that there is no basis in ethics, epistemology or 
politics, to rely on any source of authority other than that which arises in 
and from social practices.  Even if critics cannot speak in the name of 
Reason or Humanity, they need not celebrate the status quo or some 
reformist understanding of it.  The justice of any situation might be 
measured by the extent and depth of people’s participation in the 
formulation and re-formulation of the terms and conditions of their own 
lives.  In this way, people might become genuine citizens and resist the 
expedient temptation to mistake the contingent nostrums of analytical 
philosophers for enduring truths about social arrangements and the human 
condition.  The status quo is owed no greater (or lesser) respect than any 










 Looking back over the past couple of decades, Stone would likely 
be both troubled and reassured.  His plea for a more expansive and 
socially-informed understanding of jurisprudence and its legitimate 
province has been only partially heeded.  While there is more variety of 
approaches and a real sense that justice is worth talking about, analytical 
jurisprudence, especially in its dominant positivistic mode, remains the 
leading jurisprudential approach around which others must orient 
themselves.  If Stone’s mission to redetermine the province of 
jurisprudence is to be accomplished, then it will not be sufficient to 
abandon analytical jurisprudence.  As long as analytical jurisprudence 
remains even part of the lawyer’s intellectual project, then considerations 
of substantive justice will be, as Stone put it, ‘ beyond the proper scrutiny 
of the discreet lawyer’ and not ‘a necessary part’ of the lawyer’s basic 
tool-kit.  Instead, it will also be necessary to effect a complete shift away a 
technical and elite philosophical-scientific approach to a more democratic 
jurisprudential engagement.  Like the law it seeks to illuminate, legal 
theory must recognise its own political and social setting as well as its own 
responsibilities.  Moreover, law’s operation is organic, messy and 
purposive -- any legal theory that fails to appreciate and incorporate that in 
its analysis and in its analytical method is destined to fail as a valid, useful 
and/or democratic jurisprudence. Unlike the detached, static, abstract and 
precious quality of much Austinian-inspired analytical jurisprudence, a 
democratic jurisprudence can be engaged, vibrant, accessible and political. 
 
 
 
 
 
